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THE PATH TO STANDING: ASSERTING THE INHERENT INJURY  
OF THE DATA BREACH 
 
Jennifer M. Joslin* 
 
Abstract 
Data breaches are on the rise as consumers continue to exchange 
personally identifiable information for goods and services in sectors from 
retail to healthcare. In the aftermath of a data breach, it has been difficult 
for victims of the breach to establish Article III standing to sue in federal 
courts. The primary hurdle for those seeking a remedy for the theft of their 
data has been showing that they have suffered an injury-in-fact. Plaintiffs 
typically assert an injury based on the increased risk of identity theft 
following a breach. However, courts have divided on whether such an 
injury satisfies the standing test. For consumers who feel deeply that they 
have been harmed, a court’s aversion to increased-risk standing is a 
devastating barrier to redress.  
This Note argues that courts should consider a different point of 
injury. Rather than looking at the risk of future identity theft, courts should 
analyze standing based on the injury that consumers suffer the moment 
their data is stolen. Looking to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Clapper 
v. Amnesty International USA and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, this Note 
argues that the inherent injury of the data breach is an actual, concrete, 
and particularized injury that is sufficient to confer standing.  
Ultimately, shifting the standing inquiry to the inherent injury of the 
data breach will ensure that meritorious claims are heard in court. The 
shift is easily implemented—it comports with existing precedent, requires 
no new action by Congress or the Supreme Court, and is harmonious with 
the principles that underlie the doctrine of standing. Most importantly, the 
shift will ensure access to justice for a growing body of consumers who 




As society becomes increasingly digitized, the private information of everyday 
consumers becomes increasingly exposed to bad actors. With every hospital visit, 
credit card application, or subscription to the latest meal-kit service, consumers are 
compelled to exchange their personal information for goods and services. 
Unfortunately, with cyberattacks and institutional data breaches on the rise, 
consumers are increasingly likely to find their private information in the hands—or 
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on the screens—of bad actors.1 In 2017, hackers executed 1,579 data breaches in the 
United States, a 44.7 percent increase from 2016.2 Those 1,579 data breaches 
exposed over 178 million records.3 In November 2018, a massive breach of Marriott 
International’s Starwood hotel system exposed over 500 million records,4 continuing 
a vicious uptick in the data-theft trend.  
In the aftermath of an institutional data breach, consumers are left wondering 
where and from whom they can seek redress. Just as critically, as data breach victims 
turn to litigation to seek a remedy for the theft of their personal information, they 
sometimes face constitutional barriers to presenting their case. When data breach 
plaintiffs bring claims in federal court, they—like any other plaintiff—must 
establish that they have standing to sue under Article III of the U.S. Constitution 
before they can even attempt to prove their claims on the merits.5 To establish 
standing, plaintiffs must show they have satisfied the now well-known three-part 
test: they must assert (1) an injury-in-fact that is both (2) fairly traceable to the 
challenged action and (3) redressable by a favorable judicial decision.6 For data-
breach plaintiffs, properly alleging an injury-in-fact has typically been the greatest 
hurdle to establishing standing.  
Over the last decade, data-breach plaintiffs generally have sought to show an 
injury-in-fact by alleging an injury based on an increased risk of identity theft.7 
Courts have divided on whether such an injury satisfies the standing test. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth,8 Seventh,9 and Ninth Circuits10 have embraced this 
                                               
1 At Mid-Year, U.S. Data Breaches Increase at Record Pace, PR NEWSWIRE (July 18, 
2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/at-mid-year-us-data-breaches 
-increase-at-record-pace-300489369.html [https://perma.cc/5MYD-G6WW]. 
2 IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2017 ANNUAL DATA BREACH YEAR-END REVIEW 3 
(2018), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/2017Breaches/2017AnnualDataBreac 
hYearEndReview.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC7Y-UXH7]. 
3 Id. at 6. 
4 IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., MONTHLY BREACH REPORT: NOVEMBER 2018, at 2 (Dec. 
5, 2018), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/2018-November-
Monthly-Breach-List.pdf [https://perma.cc/7S5A-2BRY]. 
5 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (explaining that every 
court must answer the “threshold jurisdictional question” of whether the plaintiff has 
“standing to sue” under Article III of the U.S. Constitution). 
6 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
7 See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632–33 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(alleging an increased risk of identity theft following the breach of a banking website); Beck 
v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 273 (4th Cir. 2017) (alleging an increased risk of identity theft 
after two data breaches at a medical center).  
8 See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 392 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(granting increased-risk standing). 
9 See Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634 (granting increased-risk standing); Remijas v. Neiman 
Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015) (granting increased-risk standing).  
10 See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (granting 
increased-risk standing). 
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increased-risk theory as a cognizable injury. But the First,11 Third,12 Fourth,13 and 
Eighth14 Circuits have declined to recognize increased-risk standing in data breach 
cases. Two recent Supreme Court decisions have only further clouded the issue: 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,15 and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.16 Indeed, lower 
courts have applied Clapper and Spokeo to reach different results on the standing 
question for data-breach victims.17 For data-breach victims seeking redress in the 
courts, this divergence in case law runs contrary to the principles of justice, 
efficiency, and predictability that underlie the federal judiciary.  
In light of this uncertainty, scholars have proposed a number of solutions. These 
proposals include factor-based frameworks to determine when an increased risk of 
identity theft may qualify as an injury-in-fact18 and statutory solutions that provide 
a right to data security.19 Some commentators have suggested that courts have 
applied Clapper20 and Spokeo incorrectly. Others have argued that existing standards 
for unauthorized government surveillance should be applied to data-breach cases.21 
However, these arguments are hindered by congressional inefficiency and the 
Supreme Court’s reluctance to rule definitively on the standing question for data 
breach plaintiffs. Considering the dramatic rise of data breaches in the United States, 
coupled with the absence of congressional or Supreme Court guidance in the context 
of data breach litigation, it would be prudent for courts to adopt an approach that is  
                                               
11 See Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 78–80 (1st Cir. 2012) (denying increased-
risk standing). 
12 See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46 (3d Cir. 2011) (denying increased-risk 
standing). 
13 See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 273–76 (4th Cir. 2017) (denying increased-
risk standing). 
14 See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 771–72 (8th Cir. 2017) (denying increased-
risk standing). 
15 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
16 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
17 See, e.g., Beck, 848 F.3d at 275 (holding that the increased risk of identity theft was 
not “certainly impending” under Clapper); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 
688, 692 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that the increased risk of identity theft was “certainly 
impending” under Clapper).  
18 Thomas Martecchini, Note, A Day in Court for Data Breach Plaintiffs: Preserving 
Standing Based on Increased Risk of Identity Theft After Clapper v. Amnesty International 
USA, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1471, 1493 (2016). 
19 See generally Patrick J. Lorio, Note, Access Denied: Data Breach Litigation, Article 
III Standing, and a Proposed Statutory Solution, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 79 (2017) 
(arguing that Congress should pass a statute giving data breach victims standing to sue). 
20 Andrew Braunstein, Note, Standing Up for Their Data: Recognizing the True Nature 
of Injuries in Data Breach Claims to Afford Plaintiffs Article III Standing, 24 J.L. & POL’Y 
93, 98 (2015). 
21 Nick Beatty, Note, Standing Room Only: Solving the Injury-in-Fact Problem for 
Data Breach Plaintiffs, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1289, 1313–15 (2016). 
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rooted in Supreme Court jurisprudence, does not conflict with existing precedent 
within the circuits, and would ensure fairness and predictability for future data 
breach plaintiffs. 
This Note endeavors to provide such a solution. First, this Note discusses the 
doctrine of standing and considers the injury-in-fact requirement through the lens of 
Clapper and Spokeo. Next, it examines two cases that each reflect a general—and 
divergent—approach to increased-risk standing after Clapper and Spokeo. This Note 
then argues that courts should analyze an injury based on the theft of personal 
information during the breach, irrespective of any risk of identity theft following the 
breach. Finally, it goes on to analyze the inherent injury of the data breach under 
existing case law and argues that the theft of personal information during the breach 
is an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing.  
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  The Doctrine of Standing 
 
At the outset of any litigation in federal court,22 a plaintiff must show that she 
has standing to sue.23 In other words, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a federal 
court has the power to adjudicate her case, irrespective of the relative strengths of 
her claims.24 The doctrine of standing derives from the Constitution’s division of 
federal governmental powers between the legislative,25 executive,26 and judicial27 
branches.28 Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to 
“Cases” and “Controversies,” but it goes no further to define those terms.29 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has developed the doctrine of standing to illuminate 
the parameters of justiciability under Article III and to reinforce the “proper—and 
properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.”30  
To show that she has standing to sue in a federal court, a plaintiff must establish 
three things: (1) that she has suffered an injury-in-fact, (2) that the injury is fairly 
traceable to the action of the defendant, and (3) that the injury is redressable by a 
                                               
22 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (“The requirement 
that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of 
the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’”) (quoting 
Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).  
23 Id. at 102. 
24 Id. at 89; Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (“Jurisdiction . . . is not 
defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on 
which petitioners could actually recover.”). 
25 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1. 
26 Id. art. 2, § 1. 
27 Id. art. 3, § 1. 
28 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992).  
29 Id.  
30 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
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favorable judicial decision.31 In data breach litigation, the most daunting hurdle for 
plaintiffs typically has been establishing an injury-in-fact. This Note will analyze 
the injury-in-fact requirement through the lens of two recent cases: Clapper v. 
Amnesty International USA,32 and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.33  
An injury-in-fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest.”34 The injury 
must be “actual or imminent” and both “concrete” and “particularized.”35 First, the 
alleged injury must be either actual—that is, the injury has occurred or is ongoing—
or it must be imminent.36 An imminent injury will only support standing if it is 
“certainly impending.”37 Next, a concrete injury must be de facto; it must actually 
exist and cannot be merely abstract.38 Finally, a particularized injury “must affect 
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”39  
 
1.  Actual or Imminent 
 
A properly alleged injury-in-fact must be “actual or imminent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical.”40 In other words, a plaintiff may assert injury based on harm that 
has already occurred or is ongoing, or a plaintiff may assert a threatened injury that 
is “imminent.”41 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the question of 
imminence is “a somewhat elastic concept,” although its purpose is clear—“to 
ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative.”42 Accordingly, “[a]llegations 
of possible future injury” are not sufficient.43 Rather, an imminent injury will only 
support standing if it is “certainly impending.”44  
The Supreme Court addressed “imminence” in Clapper, wherein the Court 
faced a constitutional challenge to § 1881a of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978.45 That provision permits the Attorney General and the Director of 
National Intelligence to jointly authorize the surveillance of non-U.S. persons who 
are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.46 The provision was 
challenged by a group of attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media 
                                               
31 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
32 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
33 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
34 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
35 Monsanto Co. v. Geerston Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010). 
36 Id.  
37 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 
(1990)). 
38 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548. 
39 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1. 
40 Id. at 560 (quotations and citations omitted). 
41 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citation omitted). 
42 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n. 2. 
43 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (emphasis added).  
44 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2 (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158). 
45 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013). 
46 Id.  
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organizations who engage in sensitive communications with non-U.S. persons that 
would be likely targets of surveillance under § 1881a.47 The plaintiffs alleged that 
§ 1881a quelled their communications and compelled them to travel abroad to have 
in-person conversations, rather than speak by telephone or email.48 After both parties 
moved for summary judgment, the district court dismissed the case for lack of 
standing.49 The Second Circuit reversed on appeal, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to determine whether the plaintiffs had properly shown an injury-in-fact.50 
In Clapper, the plaintiffs alleged an “imminent” injury, claiming that there was 
an objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications would be acquired 
under § 1881a at some point in the future.51 The court rejected this theory, finding 
that the respondents failed to assert an injury-in-fact that was “certainly 
impending.”52 The Court noted that the plaintiffs had no actual knowledge of the 
Government’s surveillance practices under § 1881a and that the plaintiffs were 
relying on mere assumptions and speculations to support their theory of standing.53 
The Court pointed out that the plaintiffs’ theory rested on a “highly speculative fear” 
that the Government would (1) target persons with whom plaintiffs communicate, 
(2) invoke its authority under § 1881a, (3) meet the standards imposed by § 1881a 
and the Fourth Amendment, and (4) succeed in intercepting specific 
communications to which respondents happened to be a party.54 The Court duly 
rejected the plaintiffs’ theory of possible future surveillance because it relied on a 
“highly attenuated chain of possibilities” and required “guesswork as to how 
independent decisionmakers [would] exercise their judgment.”55 Although there was 
a possibility of future surveillance, the plaintiffs failed to show that surveillance was 
“certainly impending.”56 Thus, the alleged injury was neither “actual” nor 
“imminent.” 
 
2.  Concrete and Particularized 
 
In addition to showing that the injury is “actual or imminent,” plaintiffs must 
show that the injury is both “concrete” and “particularized.”57 For an injury to be 
“concrete,” it “must be ‘de facto’; that is, it must actually exist.”58 A tangible injury, 
such as economic or physical harm, is easy to recognize as a concrete injury.59 
                                               
47 Id. at 406. 
48 Id. at 406–07. 
49 Id. at 407. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 414. 
53 Id. at 411. 
54 Id. at 410. 
55 Id. at 410, 413. 
56 Id. at 414. 
57 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 1549. 
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However, an intangible harm also may be a “concrete” injury when it “has a close 
relationship to a harm that has traditionally . . . provid[ed] a basis for a lawsuit in 
English or American courts”60 or when Congress has manifested an intent to 
“elevat[e]” the intangible harm “to the status of [a] legally cognizable injur[y].”61 
For an injury to be “particularized,” it “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and 
individual way.”62 
In Spokeo, the Supreme Court addressed principles of concreteness and 
particularization for an aggrieved consumer who sued Spokeo, Inc. (“Spokeo”).63 
Spokeo is the operator of a “people search engine” that provides information such 
as a person’s address, marital and employment status, and education.64 After 
discovering that his Spokeo profile contained wildly inaccurate information, the 
plaintiff filed a class-action complaint, claiming that Spokeo had willfully violated 
provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (“FCRA”), including the 
requirement to engage in “fair and accurate credit reporting.”65 The district court 
dismissed the case for lack of standing, finding that the plaintiff had not properly 
pled an injury-in-fact.66 The Ninth Circuit reversed on appeal, and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari, taking the opportunity to expound on the requirements for 
showing an injury-in-fact.67  
In Spokeo, the plaintiff alleged an injury-in-fact based on violations of his 
statutory rights under the FCRA.68 The Court conducted its analysis with an eye 
toward concreteness and particularization, making clear from the outset that both 
elements are necessary, but neither is sufficient, to establish an injury-in-fact.69 The 
Court noted that the Ninth Circuit had properly addressed the particularization 
element.70 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s injury affected him in a 
“personal and individual way” because he was alleging the violation of his statutory 
rights, not just the rights of other people.71 The Ninth Circuit found additional 
support for particularization because the plaintiff’s personal interests in the handling 
of his credit information were “individualized rather than collective.”72 The Supreme 
Court found, however, that the Ninth Circuit had failed to determine whether the 
alleged injury was concrete in addition to being particularized.73 The Court 
                                               
60 Id. 
61 Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). 
62 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1. 
63 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1546. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 1545–46 (citations omitted). 
66 Id. at 1546. 
67 Id. at 1546, 1547–50. 
68 Id. at 1546.  
69 Id. at 1548. 
70 Id. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. (citation omitted). 
73 Id. at 1550. 
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ultimately remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for a factual determination, but 
not before addressing the basic principles of concreteness.74  
A concrete injury must be de facto.75 In other words, it must actually exist; it 
must be real and not abstract.76 The Court was careful to note, however, that 
“concrete” is not necessarily synonymous with “tangible.”77 Indeed, courts have 
traditionally upheld standing in the absence of physical or financial harm for torts 
such as trespass and defamation,78 and courts have even recognized intangible 
injuries to spiritual and aesthetic interests.79 In determining whether an intangible 
harm is a concrete injury-in-fact, the Court proclaimed that “both history and the 
judgment of Congress play important roles.”80 The Court recalled that the standing 
doctrine’s “case or controversy” requirement is rooted in historical practice.81 
Accordingly, “it is instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a 
close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis 
for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”82 The Court also pointed to the 
judgment of Congress, noting that “Congress is well positioned to identify intangible 
harms that meet minimum Article III requirements.”83 However, the Court cautioned 
that a plaintiff could not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement by alleging a “bare 
procedural [statutory] violation” in the absence of any concrete harm.84 Finally, the 
Court cited to Clapper, confirming that the risk of real harm may be concrete when 
the risk is “imminent.”85 
 
B.  Competing Applications of Clapper and Spokeo 
 
Over the last decade, courts have divided regarding Article III standing for data 
breach plaintiffs.86 In these cases, plaintiffs have generally attempted to establish 
standing based on the increased risk of identity theft following the breach.87 In the 
wake of Clapper and Spokeo, courts have reached different conclusions about 
                                               
74 Id. at 1548–50. 
75 Id. at 1548. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 1549. 
78 Beatty, supra note 21, at 1295. 
79 Miles L. Galbraith, Identity Crisis: Seeking a Unified Approach to Plaintiff Standing 
for Data Security Breaches of Sensitive Personal Information, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1365, 1377 
(2013). 
80 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
81 Id. 
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (granting 
standing for data breach plaintiffs); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(denying standing for data breach plaintiffs). 
87 See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that the increased risk of identity theft was sufficient to confer standing). 
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whether such an injury satisfies the standing test.88 In general, these holdings have 
been largely fact-dependent, turning on the type of data that was stolen89 or whether 
the data was targeted and understood by hackers.90 These decisions, however, are 
representative of a broad willingness or reluctance to recognize increased-risk 
standing, and they are instructive in analyzing the trajectory of data breach standing. 
This Note will address two cases that each reflect a general approach to 
increased-risk standing for data breach plaintiffs. First, in Galaria v. Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Company,91 the Sixth Circuit granted standing based on the 
increased risk of identity theft. Next, in Alleruzzo v. SuperValue, Inc.,92 the Eighth 
Circuit declined to recognize increased-risk standing.  
 
1.  Approach One: Recognizing Increased-Risk Standing 
 
In Galaria, the Sixth Circuit determined that data breach plaintiffs had Article 
III standing to sue based on the increased risk of identity theft following the breach.93 
In 2012, hackers broke into the computer network at Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Company (“Nationwide”), stealing the personally identifiable information (“PII”) of 
over one million individuals.94 The stolen data included names, birthdates, genders, 
occupations, driver’s license numbers, and social security numbers.95 Following the 
breach, a class of individuals whose PII was stolen sued Nationwide.96 The plaintiffs 
brought claims for common-law negligence, invasion of privacy, and willful and 
negligent violation of the FCRA.97 The district court dismissed the case for lack of 
standing, and the plaintiffs appealed.98 
                                               
88 Compare Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 272 (4th Cir. 2017) (denying standing 
based on the increased risk of identity theft arising out of two data breaches at a hospital, 
noting that the threat of identity theft was based on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities” 
(quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013))), with Remijas v. Neiman 
Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (granting standing after a data breach based 
on the increased risk of identity theft, noting that “[p]resumably, the purpose of the hack is, 
sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’ identities”). 
89 See, e.g., In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 771–72 (8th Cir. 2017) (rejecting 
increased-risk standing for a class of plaintiffs whose credit and debit card information was 
stolen, but who’s personal identifying information was not stolen). 
90 See, e.g., Beck, 848 F.3d at 275 (declining to assume that the thieves targeted the 
stolen laptops for the personal information they contained); see also Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 
664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting increased-risk standing after a hacker penetrated a 
payroll system firewall because it was “not known whether the hacker read, copied, or 
understood” the system’s information). 
91 663 F. App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016). 
92 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017). 
93 Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 385. 
94 Id. at 386. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 385. 
97 Id.  
98 Id. 
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The Sixth Circuit turned to the standing analysis set forth in Clapper and 
Spokeo to determine whether the plaintiffs had properly established an injury-in-
fact.99 The court first identified the alleged injury: that the theft of the plaintiffs’ PII 
placed them at a “continuing, increased risk of fraud and identity theft.”100 Because 
the plaintiffs had alleged an “imminent,” rather than an “actual” injury, the court 
next examined whether the injury was “certainly impending.”101 The court found 
that the plaintiffs’ alleged injury rose beyond the highly “speculative” allegations in 
Clapper.102 Indeed, the court declared that “[t]here is no need for speculation where 
Plaintiffs allege that their data has already been stolen and is now in the hands of 
ill-intentioned criminals.”103 Here, the court did not intimate that the theft itself 
represented an injury-in-fact; however, the court did acknowledge that following the 
theft of the plaintiffs’ PII, “a reasonable inference can be drawn that the hackers will 
use the victims’ data for . . . fraudulent purposes.”104 Thus, the court found that the 
fraudulent misuse of plaintiffs’ PII was sufficiently imminent.105 In so doing, the 
Sixth Circuit held that the increased risk of identity theft following a data breach is 
an injury-in-fact sufficient to support standing.106  
 
2.  Approach Two: Rejecting Increased-Risk Standing 
 
In SuperValu, the Eighth Circuit rejected increased-risk standing for a class of 
plaintiffs following two data breaches at a chain of grocery stores.107 In August 2014, 
SuperValu notified its customers that its computer network had been breached by 
hackers.108 One month later, SuperValu notified its customers of a second breach.109 
By placing malicious software on SuperValu’s network, the hackers had gained 
access to customers’ payment card information (“Card Information”), including 
names, credit or debit card account numbers, expiration dates, card verification value 
(CVV) codes, and personal identification numbers (PINs).110 Following the 
breaches, sixteen SuperValu customers brought suit against the retailer, alleging 
                                               
99 Id. at 387–90. The court also examined whether the injury was fairly traceable to the 
challenged action and whether the injury was redressable by a favorable decision. Id. at 390–
91. 
100 Id. at 388.  
101 Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)). 
102 Id.  
103 Id. (emphasis added).  
104 Id.  
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 389. The court also noted that but for Nationwide’s allegedly lax data security, 
the hackers would not have been able to steal the plaintiffs’ data. Thus, the injury was fairly 
traceable to Nationwide’s conduct. Id. at 390. Additionally, because the plaintiffs sought 
compensatory damages a favorable decision would provide redress. Id. at 391. 
107 In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 2017).  
108 Id. at 766. 
109 Id. 
110 Id.  
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common-law negligence, breach of implied contract, and unjust enrichment.111 The 
district court dismissed the claims for lack of standing, and plaintiffs appealed.112  
The Eighth Circuit first reviewed basic principles of standing, emphasizing that 
a class action may proceed as long as one named plaintiff has standing.113 The court 
then noted that the plaintiffs alleged two theories of standing: (1) the class of 
plaintiffs alleged an “imminent” injury, arguing that the theft of their Card 
Information put them at risk of future identify theft, and (2) one named plaintiff 
alleged an “actual” injury based on a fraudulent charge on his credit card.114 Turning 
first to the “imminent” injury, the court recognized that a future injury may support 
standing when it is “certainly impending.”115 The court found that although the 
plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that their Card Information was stolen, they failed 
to show that any misuse of their Card Information was “certainly impending.”116 
Although the court declined to definitively determine whether evidence of misuse 
following a data breach is necessary to establish standing, the court determined here 
that the plaintiffs’ increased-risk theory failed to support standing.117  
The court turned next to the “actual” injury alleged by one of the named 
plaintiffs.118 The plaintiff alleged that he suffered a fraudulent charge on the credit 
card he had used to purchase goods at a SuperValu store.119 The court determined 
that the misuse of the plaintiff’s card information was credit fraud and was thus a 
form of identity theft.120 Because identity theft is an actual, concrete, and 
particularized injury, the court determined that the plaintiff had properly alleged an 
injury-in-fact sufficient to support standing.121 What’s more, because a class action 
may proceed if at least one named plaintiff has standing, the court determined the 
entire class had Article III standing to sue in light of one named plaintiff’s “actual” 
injury.122  
Although the outcome in SuperValu was favorable for the data breach plaintiffs, 
the court’s reasoning in its standing analysis is representative of a broad reluctance 
to grant standing based on an increased risk of identity theft. 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
The division regarding increased-risk standing has caused confusion and 
unpredictability for data breach plaintiffs. In order to ensure justice, courts should 
                                               
111 Id. at 767. 
112 Id.  
113 Id. at 768 (citing Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 446 (2009)). 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 769. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 771–72. 
118 Id. at 772. 
119 Id.  
120 Id.  
121 Id.  
122 Id. at 772–74. 
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adopt an approach that comports with the doctrine of standing and provides access 
to the judicial system for data breach plaintiffs. This Note makes two arguments to 
support such an approach. First, courts should shift the injury-in-fact inquiry to the 
theft of personal information during the breach, rather than the increased risk of 
identity theft following the breach. Next, courts should grant standing based on the 
inherent injury of the data breach in accordance with existing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and in line with the principles that underlie the doctrine of standing. 
 
A.  Courts Should Shift the Injury-In-Fact Inquiry to the Inherent Injury  
of the Data Breach 
 
The first step in determining whether a plaintiff has properly established Article 
III standing is to identify the alleged injury. Only then can the court examine whether 
the alleged injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action and redressable by a 
favorable judicial decision.123 The most common alleged injury in data breach cases 
is the increased risk of identity theft following the breach.124 This Note argues that 
the increased-risk theory, however, is an ineffective means by which to determine 
whether data breach plaintiffs may be heard in a federal court. Instead, this Note 
asserts that courts should analyze the elements of standing based on an earlier point 
of injury: the data breach itself. Specifically, courts should identify and analyze the 
injury based on the theft of plaintiffs’ data and should then determine whether that 
“actual” injury is “concrete” and “particularized.”125  
Although a court’s standing analysis is largely guided by the plaintiff’s 
assertions at the pleading stage, a plaintiff would not need to assert the inherent 
injury theory in her complaint.126 Indeed, the Supreme Court has specified that “it is 
unnecessary to set out a legal theory for the plaintiff’s claim for relief” in a 
pleading.127 As long as the plaintiff alleges facts demonstrating her actual injury, she 
has met her burden at the pleading stage.128 Thus, as long as a plaintiff alleges that 
her personal information was stolen in a data breach, a court has the power to 
determine whether the breach itself is an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing. 
                                               
123 Monsanto Co. v. Geerston Seed Farm, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010). 
124 See, e.g., Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017) (alleging increased-risk 
standing); In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017) (alleging increased-risk 
standing); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016) (alleging 
increased-risk standing); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(alleging increased-risk standing); Katz v. Pershing, LLC 672 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(alleging increased-risk standing); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(alleging increased-risk standing); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 
2010) (alleging increased-risk standing); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (alleging increased-risk standing). 
125 Monsanto, 561 U.S. at 149. 
126 See SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 772 (accepting a successful theory of injury despite the 
plaintiff’s failure to plead that theory of injury in the Complaint). 
127 Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (citation omitted). 
128 SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 772. 
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Support for identifying the injury as the breach itself is best shown by analogy 
to Clapper. In Clapper, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that a law permitting 
surveillance of non-U.S. citizens located abroad was unconstitutional.129 The 
plaintiffs, believing that their own communications with non-U.S. persons located 
abroad were likely to be surveilled, sued in federal court.130 The plaintiffs attempted 
to establish standing based on a theory of “imminent” injury, asserting an 
“objectively reasonable likelihood” that their communications would be surveilled 
under the law in question.131 Importantly, the plaintiffs could not establish and did 
not assert that any of their communications had already been targeted.132  
In contrast, data breach plaintiffs have historically been able to prove the actual 
theft of their data.133 Moreover, the existence of the breach has traditionally gone 
undisputed.134 Unlike the Clapper plaintiffs, who could not prove that they had been 
subject to surveillance, data breach plaintiffs have proved without contest that they 
have been subject to lost data.135 If consumers brought suit against an institution for 
the negligent stewardship of their data before any data breach had occurred, it would 
be appropriate to apply Clapper’s imminence analysis and determine whether a data 
breach was “certainly impending.” But where the plaintiff has demonstrated that her 
data has already been stolen, it would be more appropriate to determine whether that 
“actual” injury is “concrete” and “particularized” under Spokeo.  
In recent years, some commentators have advocated for maintaining the theory 
of increased-risk standing.136 These arguments propose that courts should recognize 
increased-risk standing when certain factors are present that elevate the risk to an 
“imminent” injury in line with Clapper.137 Specifically, these arguments suggest that 
the increased risk of identity theft is sufficiently imminent when plaintiffs can show 
that the hack was deliberate and targeted or that there has been fraudulent activity 
following the breach.138 Alternatively, some commentators suggest that courts 
should recognize the increased-risk theory even in the absence of aggravating 
                                               
129 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 406–07 (2013). 
130 Id. at 401. 
131 Id. at 407. 
132 Id. at 411 (“[R]espondents have no actual knowledge of the Government’s § 1881a 
targeting practices. Instead, respondents merely speculate and make assumptions about 
whether their communications with their foreign contacts will be acquired under § 1881a.”).  
133 See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(“Plaintiffs allege that their data has already been stolen and is now in the hands of fill-
intentioned criminals.”). 
134 See id. at 386 (“On October 3, 2012 hackers broke into Nationwide’s computer 
network and stole the personal information of Plaintiffs and 1.1 million others.”). Plaintiffs 
are generally informed that their data has been stolen by the institution that was breached. 
See id.  
135 Braunstein, supra note 20, at 108 (arguing that courts have misapplied Clapper to 
data breach cases). 
136 See Galbraith, supra note 79, at 1371–72; Martecchini, supra note 18, at 1474. 
137 Martecchini, supra note 18, at 1487. 
138 Id.  
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factors.139 These arguments analogize to the “latent harm” analysis used in medical 
malpractice and environmental harm cases and suggest that courts that have refused 
to recognize increased-risk standing have improperly applied the law.140  
These arguments raise important considerations in the discussion surrounding 
data breach standing. However, in proposing a framework by which to analyze a 
future injury, these arguments overlook the existing, actual injury of the theft of 
plaintiffs’ personal information. In doing so, these arguments are promoting a theory 
of standing whereby courts are asked to predict the future rather than addressing an 
injury that has already occurred.141 What’s more, the increased-risk approach raises 
questions about whether the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant. To construe 
the injury as occurring when there has been fraudulent misuse is to intertwine the 
injury with the acts of third parties who are not present in the litigation.142 In contrast, 
to construe the injury as occurring when the data has been stolen is to recognize that 
institutions are no more culpable for their negligent stewardship of consumer data 
when the data has been misused than they are when the data has been stolen. 
Moreover, advocating for recognition of increased-risk standing overlooks 
precedent in the First,143 Third,144 Fourth,145 and Eighth Circuits146 that would make 
it difficult for plaintiffs to establish standing based on increased risk. Given the 
Supreme Court’s reluctance to address the issue thus far, it would be prudent for trial 
and appellate courts to adopt a framework that comports with existing law and 
ensures fairness and consistency for future data breach plaintiffs.  
Thus, courts should shift the standing inquiry to the inherent injury of the data 
breach. When plaintiffs can show that their information was stolen in a data breach, 
courts should recognize the theft as an injury-in-fact sufficient to support standing 
because (1) Supreme Court jurisprudence supports recognition of such an injury, 
and (2) the injury comports with the principles that underlie the doctrine of standing. 
  
                                               
139 Galbraith, supra note 79, at 1398. 
140 Id. at 1387, 1398. 
141 See Beatty, supra note 21, at 1303 (arguing that courts should not be asked to predict 
the future). 
142 See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 392 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(Batchelder, J., dissenting) (“If [Plaintiffs] suffered injury, it was at the hands of criminal 
third-party actors, and their complaints do not make the factual allegations necessary to fairly 
trace that injury to [Defendant].”). 
143 Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2012). 
144 Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011). 
145 Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017). 
146 In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017). 
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B.  Courts Should Recognize the Inherent Injury of the Data Breach as Sufficient  
to Support Standing 
 
1.  Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
 
Supreme Court jurisprudence supports recognition of the inherent injury of the 
data breach. In order to properly allege an injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must show that 
she has suffered an “invasion of a legally protected interest,”147 and that the harm is 
“actual or imminent” and “concrete and particularized.”148 Under the principles set 
forth in Clapper and Spokeo, the inherent injury of the data breach qualifies as an 
injury-in-fact because (a) the theft represents an actual—not imminent—harm, and 
(b) the injury is both concrete and particularized. 
 
(a)  Actual or Imminent 
 
To properly allege an injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must show that she has suffered 
an “actual” injury that has already occurred or is ongoing, or that she will suffer an 
“imminent” injury.149 If a plaintiff alleges a threatened injury that has not yet 
occurred, courts must employ the analysis set forth in Clapper to determine whether 
the threatened injury is “certainly impending,” or whether it is merely 
“speculative.”150 However, if a plaintiff alleges an injury that is ongoing or has 
already occurred, courts must determine whether that “actual” injury is “concrete 
and particularized” under Spokeo.151 
For data breach plaintiffs, courts have traditionally analyzed an injury based on 
the increased risk of identity theft. Accordingly, courts have utilized the analysis in 
Clapper to determine whether identity theft is “certainly impending” in the 
aftermath of a data breach.152 But this inquiry is unnecessary when courts recognize 
an injury based on the theft of plaintiffs’ personal information, irrespective of 
potential fraudulent misuse of that information. When courts analyze standing based 
on the “actual” injury of the stolen data, the inquiry should proceed to whether that 
injury is both “concrete” and “particularized” under Spokeo.153 
  
                                               
147 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
148 Monsanto Co. v. Geerston Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010). 
149 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citation omitted). 
150 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410, 414 (2013). 
151 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). 
152 See, e.g., Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 276 (4th Cir. 2016) (relying on Clapper 
to hold that future identity theft was not certainly impending following the theft of a hospital 
laptop containing sensitive personal information). 
153 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548. 
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(b)  Concrete and Particularized 
 
A properly alleged injury-in-fact must be both “concrete and particularized.”154 
An injury is “particularized” when it affects the plaintiff “in a personal and 
individual way.”155 An injury is “concrete” when it is “real” or “actually exists” and 
is not “abstract.”156 An intangible harm may be a “concrete” injury when it “has a 
close relationship to a harm that has traditionally . . . provid[ed] a basis for a lawsuit 
in English or American courts,”157 or when Congress has manifested an intent to 
“elevat[e]” the intangible harm “to the status of [a] legally cognizable injur[y].”158 
For plaintiffs bringing suit in the aftermath of a data breach, there is little doubt 
that the theft of their personal information is a “particularized” injury that affects 
them “in a personal and individual way.” In the wake of a data breach, victims incur 
both financial and emotional harms.159 For example, the Galaria plaintiffs alleged 
that: 
 
[They] “have suffered, and will continue to suffer” costs—both “financial 
and temporal”—that include “purchasing credit reporting services, 
purchasing credit monitoring and/or internet monitoring services, 
frequently obtaining, purchasing and reviewing credit reports, bank 
statements, and other similar information, instituting and/or removing 
credit freezes and/or closing or modifying financial accounts.”160  
 
Given the highly personal nature of the information stolen, in concert with the 
very real threat of fraudulent misuse of that data, there is little question that theft of 
personal information represents a “particularized” injury. The critical question, then, 
is whether the theft of personal information during an institutional data breach is a 
“concrete” injury. 
A “concrete” injury is easily recognizable when a plaintiff has suffered physical 
or financial harm.161 When plaintiffs have suffered these sorts of tangible harms, the 
issue of concreteness is generally not even disputed.162 However, as the Supreme 
Court noted in Spokeo, an intangible harm may qualify as a concrete injury.163 
Indeed, courts have long been willing to recognize intangible injuries in actions such 
as trespass, defamation, and breach of contract.164 In determining whether an 
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155 Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992)). 
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intangible injury may qualify as a concrete injury, it is instructive to look to history 
and consider whether the alleged injury bears a relation to a harm that has 
“traditionally . . . provid[ed] a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”165 
Additionally, for plaintiffs alleging statutory violations, courts may consider 
whether Congress intended to “elevat[e] the status” of the intangible harm 
encompassed in the statute to a “legally cognizable” injury sufficient to confer 
standing.166 
For example, in In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. Data Breach 
Litigation,167 the Third Circuit determined whether data breach plaintiffs had Article 
III standing by applying the concreteness analysis set forth in Spokeo. In Horizon, 
plaintiffs brought suit against their health insurer after two laptops containing 
plaintiffs’ unencrypted personal information were allegedly stolen from the insurer’s 
headquarters.168 The plaintiffs asserted common-law claims such as negligence, 
breach of contract, and invasion of privacy, as well as violations of the FCRA.169 
Importantly, the Horizon plaintiffs argued that the unauthorized disclosure of their 
personal information was, in and of itself, an injury-in-fact.170 The Third Circuit 
applied the two-part concreteness test set forth in Spokeo, looking both to “history 
and the judgment” of Congress.171 The court ultimately granted standing based on 
the alleged violations of the FCRA.172 However, the reasoning employed in both the 
majority and concurring opinions is valuable in assessing whether the theft of 
personal information may qualify as a concrete injury in the context of statutory 
violations or common-law claims. 
Looking first to history, the Third Circuit noted that “‘unauthorized disclosures 
of information’ have long been seen as injurious.”173 Hearkening to common-law 
privacy torts, the court noted that improper dissemination of information can 
represent a concrete, cognizable injury.174 Indeed, the court cited to the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, which states that “[o]ne who invades the right of privacy of 
another is subject to liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other.”175 
Although the majority noted that the unauthorized disclosure of personal 
information resulting from a data breach was closely related to privacy torts long 
recognized in English and American courts, they concluded that the defendant’s 
                                               
165 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
166 Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 278).  
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actions would not “give rise to a cause of action under common law.”176 However, 
the court turned next to the judgment of Congress, finding that the passage of the 
FCRA showed that Congress intended to elevate the status of the unauthorized 
dissemination of personal information to a “concrete,” “legally cognizable” injury-
in-fact.177 Thus, the Third Circuit granted Article III standing for data breach 
plaintiffs based on the inherent injury of the breach itself, irrespective of the 
likelihood of future identity theft.178 
For many data breach plaintiffs, the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Horizon will 
serve as a promising guidepost. Given the availability of the FCRA, many data 
breach plaintiffs will likely be able to establish Article III standing by pointing to 
the judgment of Congress. However, because the FCRA is targeted to “consumer 
reporting agencies,”179 it will not be an appropriate cause of action in every data 
breach case. Although data breach plaintiffs have successfully alleged violations of 
the FCRA in the context of breaches at insurance companies,180 it is easy to see how 
the victims of a data breach at a retail organization or service provider could be 
disadvantaged simply because of the nature of the organization that failed to protect 
their data. Some commentators have proposed statutory solutions that would 
“elevate the status” of a data breach to a concrete injury.181 Although a legislative 
solution would certainly promote justice and access to the courts for data breach 
plaintiffs, these arguments are subject to the political realities associated with 
passing a comprehensive data breach statute.182 Given the inefficiency and 
uncertainty associated with congressional action, it would be prudent for courts to 
adopt a sensible judicial solution that comports with existing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and does not conflict with circuit precedent.183 Accordingly, courts 
should recognize the theft of personal information in a data breach as a concrete 
injury sufficient to confer standing. 
Given the close relationship between the theft of personal information and 
common-law privacy torts, courts may properly recognize the theft of personal 
information as a concrete injury. As the Third Circuit noted in Horizon, the common 
law has historically permitted claims based on invasions of privacy even when the 
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plaintiff cannot prove actual damages.184 For example, a plaintiff may bring a claim 
for defamation without proving any specific harm to her reputation.185 Likewise, 
damages are available for privacy torts “in the same way in which general damages 
are given for defamation,” without proof of “pecuniary loss [or] physical harm.”186 
In the context of data breach litigation, the theft of personal information during a 
breach bears a close relationship to long-recognized privacy torts. Just as actual harm 
in privacy torts is a question of damages rather than a question of injury-in-fact, the 
risk of future identity theft in data breach cases should be a matter of damages, rather 
than a potential bar to Article III standing.  
Moreover, courts should recognize the inherent injury of the data breach as a 
concrete injury because the theft of personal information is a violation of a private 
right, rather than a public right. Private rights are those rights “belonging to 
individuals, considered as individuals,” historically including rights of personal 
security and reputation, property rights, and contract rights.187 When a plaintiff 
brings suit for the violation of a private right, courts have historically found that the 
plaintiff suffered a concrete, de facto injury “merely from having [her] personal, 
legal rights invaded.”188 Accordingly, plaintiffs asserting the violation of private 
rights have not historically been required to show additional harm to establish a 
“case or controversy.”189 In contrast, courts have typically required a showing of 
additional harm when plaintiffs allege violations of public rights.190 Public rights are 
those that involve duties owed “to the whole community, considered as a 
community, in its social aggregate capacity.”191 For example, in a public nuisance 
suit, a plaintiff must allege “special, individualized damage” as a result of the 
nuisance in order to seek relief for “an otherwise public-rights claim.”192 Because 
the theft of personal information represents a private right and is closely related to 
common-law tort claims, courts should recognize the theft of personal information 
as a concrete injury. 
In the wake of an institutional data breach, plaintiffs may bring suit based on 
the theft of their personal information. When plaintiffs can show that their 
information has been stolen, courts should apply the Article III standing analysis set 
forth in Clapper and Spokeo to determine whether the theft represents an injury-in-
fact sufficient to confer standing. Because the theft of plaintiffs’ personal 
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information is an “actual” injury that is both “particularized” and “concrete,” courts 
should grant standing based on the inherent injury of the data breach. 
 
2.  Principles of Standing 
 
The final step in determining whether courts should recognize the inherent 
injury of the data breach is to consider whether doing so would violate the principles 
that underlie the doctrine of standing. The Supreme Court has developed the doctrine 
of standing to support Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement. More 
specifically, requiring a plaintiff to show that she has standing to sue is meant to 
ensure the “properly limited . . . role of the courts in a democratic society”193 and to 
“prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political 
branches.”194 When a dispute would require the court to “decide whether an action 
taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was 
unconstitutional,” the court’s standing inquiry will be “especially rigorous.”195 
However, “when a private plaintiff seeks to enforce only [her] personal rights against 
another private party,” concern about the judiciary’s entanglement in political 
disputes is generally absent.196  
Data breach litigation typically takes the form of private individuals suing to 
redress their own private rights. In this context, there is no threat of judicial 
entanglement in political disputes, nor is there concern about the judiciary usurping 
political powers. Indeed, in the context of data breach litigation, there is no danger 
that the suit “is an impermissible attempt to police the activity of the political 
branches.”197 By recognizing the inherent injury of the data breach, courts do not run 





As services like healthcare, banking, and retail shopping become increasingly 
digitized, consumers will continue to entrust institutions with their sensitive, 
personal information. With data breaches on the rise, consumers’ personal 
information will remain under constant threat of compromise. In the aftermath of 
these breaches, victims will continue to turn to the courts to seek redress for the 
violation of their privacy and the disruption of their trust. In order to be heard in 
federal court, data breach plaintiffs will need to show that they have suffered an 
injury-in-fact sufficient to support Article III standing. 
Courts have divided on whether to grant standing based on the increased risk 
of identity theft in the wake of a data breach. In order to ensure predictability and 
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195 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997). 
196 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1551–53 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
197 Id. at 1553. 
2019] THE PATH TO STANDING 755 
justice for future data breach plaintiffs, courts should shift the injury-in-fact inquiry 
to the theft of plaintiffs’ personal information, irrespective of future misuse of that 
information. Based on the requirements set forth in Clapper and Spokeo, and in 
accordance with the principles that underlie the doctrine of standing, courts should 
recognize the inherent injury of the data breach as an injury-in-fact sufficient to 
confer Article III standing. 
